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OLITICAL infighting-far worse than in most Texas legislative
sessions-characterized the 2003 regular session, as well as the
three special sessions that followed. The political turmoil impacted
both substantive and procedural changes considered by the legislators in
their continuing efforts to address Texas's policy and revenue needs.1
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
A handful of cases during the Survey period dealt with sales tax issues.
In Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc., Raytheon sought a refund for
sales taxes on the purchase of tangible overhead items it had charged as
indirect costs and allocated among a number of government contracts.2
The comptroller argued that Raytheon was not entitled to an exemption
under Section 151.302(a) as a "sale for resale of a taxable item" because,
according to Section 151.005(1), such a sale required the "transfer of title
or possession of tangible personal property."'3 The court agreed with Ray-
theon that there was sufficient evidence of title transfer because the Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulations stated that "the [g]overnment is vested with
title to all reimbursable property."'4 The court also rejected the comptrol-
ler's assertion that the federal government had abandoned title to the
overhead items "because Raytheon controls and uses" them.5 The court
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noted that "Raytheon was obligated by contract to consume the overhead
items,"'6 and it did so "in the normal course of its business" of "perform-
ing contracts to provide intelligence systems, aircraft navigation systems,
and other defense-related products to the federal government."' 7 The
court found against Raytheon, however, on a procedural matter: in bring-
ing an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the com-
pany "impermissibly sought declaratory relief that was redundant to the
relief provided for in the tax code."'8
One of the more interesting sales tax cases during the past year,
Strayhorn v. Ethical Society of Austin,9 clarifies the meaning of "religious
organization" under various sections of the tax code. The Ethical Society
of Austin, a group of people who practice a belief system called "Ethical
Culture," sought a sales tax exemption as a religious organization under
Texas Tax Code Section 151.310(a)(1). 10 It was denied "on the ground
that the Ethical Society must demonstrate that it requires belief in a
'God, Gods, or higher power' . . . in order to qualify."'" The trial court
found that test to be "unconstitutionally underinclusive," and the Austin
Court of Appeals agreed. 12 Basing its analysis on several United States
Supreme Court cases 13 and applying the test set out in Malnak v. Yogi, 14
the court asked whether a particular set of beliefs "(1) address[es] funda-
mental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable
matters such as the meaning of life and death or man's role in the uni-
verse; (2) [is] broad in scope and comprehensive in nature; and (3) [is]
accompanied by the presence of certain formal and external signs.' 5
Under this standard, the Ethical Society was eligible for tax exemption. 16
The taxpayer in Ghashim v. State was the owner of a restaurant appeal-
ing from a judgment against him personally for delinquent sales taxes
incurred by his business. 17 Ghashim raised three issues, and the court
found against him on each. First, he argued "the [s]tate [had] failed to
prove that he, individually, had collected any sales tax."18 The court
found inapposite the case of Parker v. State,t9 on which the taxpayer re-
lied: "In Parker, the issue was not how much sales tax was collected by
6. Id.
7. Id. at 567.
8. Id. at 573.
9. Strayhorn v. Ethical Soc'y of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no
pet. h.).
10. Id. at 461.
11. Id.
12. ld.
13. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
14. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
15. Ethical Society of Austin, 110 S.W.3d at 469. The court's holding closed an inter-
esting chapter in which the comptroller had originally ruled the Society exempt and then
revoked the ruling after adverse publicity.
16. Id. at 472-73.
17. Ghashim v. State, 104 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
18. Id. at 186.
19. Parker v. State, 36 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
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the defendant as an individual, but rather, how much sales tax was col-
lected by the corporation. ' 20 In the present case, there was no question
about the amount collected by the restaurant and, added the court, "there
is no statutory requirement that [the responsible individual] must have
physically received or collected the sales tax in person." 2' Furthermore,
to add such a requirement "would be inconsistent with the statutory pro-
vision that imposes liability on a responsible individual who is under a
duty to account for and pay over the tax."'22 The court also dispensed with
the taxpayer's second argument ("that the district court [had] abused its
discretion [by] admitting the comptroller's certificate of delinquency be-
cause it was hearsay evidence") by finding that such a certificate "consti-
tutes prima facie proof . . . of the tax owed."'23 Such evidence was
presumed correct.24 The comptroller had at one time "notified [Ghashim]
that she had released a tax lien filed in error under his individual tax
identification number, ' 25 but then her office assessed him again, individu-
ally, for the period at issue. Ghashim argued that the state was, there-
fore, estopped from the suit, "because the comptroller [had] released a
tax lien filed against him in error. ' 26 The court found that Ghashim had
not pled, proven and secured the elements required to establish estoppel,
and, moreover, "the released tax lien was different from the delinquent
taxes at issue."' 27 Finding for the state on all issues, the court affirmed the
district court's judgment that Ghashim was personally liable for the sales
taxes.2
8
In Littlefield v. Texas,29 the court examined the intersection of the tax
code and the penal code. Defendant Littlefield had been found guilty at
trial of misapplication of fiduciary property and of organized criminal ac-
tivity under the Texas Penal Code in connection with his failure to turn
over to the state money that had been collected from his business as sales
tax.30 On appeal, Littlefield claimed, inter alia, that his cases were gov-
erned solely by the Tax Code and not by the Penal Code.31 The court
disagreed, finding that penalties under the Penal Code and under Section
151.703 of the Tax Code are not exclusive. 32 When two provisions have
different purposes in mind, reasoned the court, both may apply: "Under
the in pari materia principle of statutory construction; two statutes with
similarity of purpose must be harmonized if possible," but this "rule is not
20. Ghashim, 104 S.W.3d at 187.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 187-88.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 186.
26. Id. at 188.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Littlefield v. State, Nos. 05-00-02102-CR, 05-00-02103-CR, 2003 LEXIS 3845 Tex.
App.-Dallas May 6, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id.
32. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §151.703 (Vernon 2002).
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applicable to enactments that cover different situations and that were ap-
parently not intended to be considered together. '33 Tax Code Section
151.703 contemplates a "monetary penalty" on those who fail to file or
pay the tax; Penal Code Section 32.45 creates the felony of "misapplica-
tion of fiduciary property. '34 The two sections "have different elements
of proof, provide different penalties, serve different purposes and objec-
tives, and are contained in different legislative acts."'35 In addition, the
Tax Code itself provides for criminal penalties when a taxpayer "inten-
tionally or knowingly" fails to remit the tax collected. 36
The court upheld the comptroller's interpretation of her own rule in
Perry Homes v. Strayhorn.37 The taxpayer/homebuilder claimed a refund
of sales taxes on the grounds "that the lump-sum purchase prices it had
paid its independent contractors [had] included sales tax."'38 The court
found for the comptroller, noting that if the contractors did not "(1) add
sales tax to the purchase price and (2) either 'separately state' on the bill,
contract, or invoice that sales tax was included in the stated price or pro-
vide a written statement that the stated price included tax," then the tax-
payer would lose.39 It did not accept Perry Homes's argument that
language in the contracts and in correspondence with the contractors
proved that the lump sum included tax. Rather, noted the court, those
documents merely constituted indemnities and were "insufficient to over-
come the presumption that the purchase price did not include sales
tax."'40 This case emphasizes again the comptroller's view that a taxes-
paid clause is not sufficient to protect the buyer from a sales tax assess-
ment unless the clause is specific to sales taxes.
The United Services Automobile Association (USAA) sought a sales
tax refund under now-repealed Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code, which levied an occupation tax on insurance companies with
the proviso that "[n]o other tax shall be levied or collected from any in-
surance carrier by the state, county, or city or any town, but this law shall
not be construed to prohibit the levy and collection of... taxes upon the
real and personal property of such carrier. '41 The court rejected the tax-
payer's statutory construction argument, based on Fleming Foods of
Texas, Inc. v. Rylander,42 and characterized that holding as applicable
33. Littlefield, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 3845, at *7.
34. Id. at *7-8 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.703 (Vernon 2003) and TEX. PENAL
CODE § 32.45 (Vernon 2002)).
35. Id. at *8.
36. Id.; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.7032(a) (Vernon 2004).
37. Perry Homes v. Strayhorn, 108 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
38. Id. at 445.
39. Id. at 446.
40. Id. at 447.
41. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Strayhorn, 124 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003, pet. filed). TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 4.10-.11 (Vernon 2004) were repealed by Tex.
H.B. 2922, § 26, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1274, effective Apr. 1, 2005.
42. Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284-85 (Tex. 1999).
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only to recently codified statutes.43 Instead, the court traced the history
of taxation of insurance companies in Texas and concluded that the provi-
sions at issue "created a system of occupation taxes specific to the insur-
ance industry"; accordingly, exemptions in those provisions "acted only
to exempt the insurance industry from general occupation and franchise
taxes," not from other non-occupation and non-franchise taxes imposed
later, such as sales and use taxes. 44 The court therefore upheld the tax
assessment.
45
Burgess v. Gallery Model Homes, Inc. ,46 addresses the issue of whom a
consumer may sue for a refund of improperly collected sales taxes. The
taxpayer had sued a retailer, but the court found that such an action does
not lie: "[T]he comprehensive scheme set out in Sections 111.104,
111.105[,] and 112.151 et seq. of the Tax Code and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder provide the exclusive means of obtaining a refund of an
improperly collected sales tax."'47 Because the taxpayer had not ex-
hausted her administrative remedies, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over the suit.48 This case, with Fleming Foods, illustrates the state's con-
tinuing difficulty in determining which parties are responsible for filing-
and responding to-refund claims. Burgess fairly concludes that consum-
ers should follow statutory refund procedures rather than filing suit
against retailers-a conclusion currently being tested in several states by
class actions filed against sellers.
Two Attorney General rulings elucidate aspects of the Texas sales tax
with respect to economic incentives that municipalities may offer to busi-
nesses or developers. In the first ruling, General Abbott found that Arti-
cle III, Section 55, of the Texas Constitution does not prohibit the rebate
by a city of a portion of the municipal sales tax.49 The constitutional pro-
vision prohibits the legislature or political subdivisions from "releasing or
extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation
of any corporation or individual," but it does not prohibit a rebate of
those taxes once they have been collected.50
In the second ruling, General Abbott addressed the scope of authority
of an economic development corporation's board of directors over expen-
43. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 124 S.W.3d at 729. Cynics might well argue that the
distinction was results-oriented, although the court was likely correct in concluding that the
Texas Legislature did not intend to exempt insurance companies from virtually all taxes.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 4.10-.11 (Vernon 2004) were repealed by Tex. H.B. 2922, § 26,
78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1274, effective April 1, 2005.
44. Id. at 732.
45. Id.
46. Burgess v. Gallery Model Homes, Inc., 101 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
47. Id. at 558.
48. Id.
49. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0071 (2003).
50. Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. III, § 55). This ruling, issued in May of 2003, was in
response to a request by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who sponsored the underlying




diture of sales tax revenues collected under Section 4A of the Develop-
ment Corporation Act.51 The city of Hutto had created such a
corporation, and the corporation's board of directors voted to use a por-
tion of their revenue to "help finance a proposed [fiberglass] hippopota-
mus statue" to serve as the local mascot.52 The Hutto city council,
however, objected to the expenditure. The Attorney General approached
the controversy with the assumption that the authority for this particular
development corporation did not itself impose a limitation on how the
board could spend its Section 4A proceeds.53 He noted that the statute,
Section 4A(b)(1), 54 allows a development corporation to spend up to ten
percent of its revenues for "promotional purposes," which he defined as
actions that "advertise or publicize the city for the purpose of developing
new and expanded business enterprises. '55 Whether erecting a hippopot-
amus statue constitutes such an acceptable purpose, said the opinion, is
not for the Attorney General to determine, but for the corporation's
board of directors. Actions of that board, however, are subject to review
and approval by the city council, and the maximum that could be spent
for such a promotional project would be ten percent of the Section 4A
revenue collected in a particular year.5 6
Although it is beyond the scope of this Survey to discuss the letter rul-
ings issued last year by the comptroller, at least a few merit discussion. A
comptroller letter confirmed that "[d]igital music programming provided
via satellite is not taxable," whereas if news or other information were
provided by satellite, that would be taxable as an information service.57
Another comptroller letter addressed the issue of software modification,
when one company provides a number of professional services for an-
other company.58 The services at issue consisted of "implementation of
software upgrades and modifications of software functionality necessary
to meet business and technology requirements" and "did not involve any
source code modifications and could have been performed by various
[other] vendors. '59 The comptroller found that those services were
taxable. 60
51. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0086 (2003).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5190.6(4A)(b)(1) (Vernon 2004).
55. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0086 (2003).
56. Id. Author's note: Don't you find it at least a little refreshing to be reading about
hippopotamuses in a tax article?
57. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, STAR System No. 200301681L (Jan. 10, 2003),
at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/. By contrast, the Comptroller asserts that downloading
digital music constitutes a taxable sale of tangible personal property. Tex. Comptroller
Pub. Accounts, STAR System, No. 200005359L (May 30, 2000), at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.
us/star/.





Hearing No. 41,738 concluded that software training charges were taxa-
ble when they had not been separately stated on the invoices, under Rule
3.308.61 In the manufacturing realm, the petitioner in Hearing No. 41,846
sought an exemption from tax on purchase of a conveyor system, on the
grounds that it "was an integrated component of an automated manufac-
turing machine. ' 62 The comptroller disagreed, noting that under a change
in the law effective October 1, 1997, conveyors are "expressly excluded
from the manufacturing exemption, which itself was confined ... to nec-
essary and essential manufacturing equipment that caused a physical or
chemical change to the product being manufactured or an intermediary
or component product. '63 The equipment at issue did not meet that re-
quirement, in the comptroller's view. Hearing No. 40, 282 addressed an-
other manufacturing issue, holding that sanitizing and cleaning services
are taxable when there is a mix of taxable and nontaxable services in-
cluded and the taxable portion exceeds five percent of the total charge.64
In Hearing No. 41,036, the comptroller found that the taxpayer quali-
fied for the occasional sale exemption even though the taxpayer had
transferred equipment to another business segment shortly before selling
the entire remaining operating assets of a business or a business seg-
ment. 65 Moreover, the retirement of obsolete equipment did not affect
the exemption status.66 This decision is helpful because it confirms that
the one-sale to one-buyer rule 67 does not preclude a taxpayer from selling
off certain assets prior to the occasional sale; unfortunately, comptroller
decisions in this area remain too fact-specific to constitute clear planning
guidance. In Hearing No. 42,654, petitioner, a soft-drink bottler and dis-
tributor, sought an exemption for the purchase of "post-mix machines
and repair parts for the post-mix machines" that he provided to his cus-
tomers as an inducement for them to purchase his products. 68 Petitioner
would sell canisters of the syrup and carbon dioxide to a restaurant, for
example, and "place" a post-mix machine on the premises as well, retain-
ing ownership of the machine. The customer could obtain possession of
the machine by renting it or by agreeing to purchase all of the ingredients
from petitioner.69 The comptroller found that petitioner's purchase of
these machines was not a purchase for resale with respect to the machines
61. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 2003049164 (April 11, 2003), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
62. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200305001H (May 30, 2003), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
63. Id.
64. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200212640H (Dec. 9, 2002), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
65. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200212691H (Dec. 6, 2002), at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
66. Id.
67. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(d) (2004).
68. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System No. 200211718H (Nov. 7, 2002). A





that were not rented by the customers and was, therefore, not exempt
from taxation.70
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
As noted earlier, political turmoil marked the 2003 legislative sessions,
slowing (and sometimes derailing) substantive sales tax changes. How-
ever, the legislature did make progress in several areas, including in
Texas's efforts to move closer to compliance with the principles of the
Streamlined Sales Tax Program.
The legislature made a number of changes to the basic definitions that
shape the Tax Code. In one such change, the 78th Legislature attempted
to clarify the meaning of "data processing service" and "data storage":
legislation added a new sentence to the definition of data processing ser-
vices to provide that data storage (a subset of data processing services)
"does not include a classified advertisement, banner advertisement, verti-
cal advertisement, or link . . . displayed on ... website[s] owned by an-
other person. ' 71 Legislators also added a new phrase to the definition of
"Sale" or "Purchase," to state explicitly that a "charge for an extended
warranty or service contract for the performance of a taxable service,"
when done for consideration, constitutes a "Sale" or "Purchase. ' 72 In
response to the Austin Court of Appeals ruling in Sharp v. Morton Build-
ings, Inc.,73 the legislature also amended the definition of "use." The new
definition of "use" now includes the following language: "the exercise of
a right or power incidental to the ownership of tangible personal property
over tangible personal property, including tangible personal property
other than printed material that has been processed, fabricated, or manu-
factured into other property or attached to or incorporated into other
property transported into this state."'74 The extent to which the language
will overturn Morton Buildings remains unclear, particularly because of
the printed material exclusions designed to protect numerous items, such
as phone directories, that are printed outside Texas.
As part of the ongoing effort to bring Texas into compliance with the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, the 78th Legislature added
several new sections to the Tax Code and altered a number of preexisting
sections. One addition requires rate changes in sales tax to be effective as
70. Id. In case you are feeling hungry as you move into the next section of the article,
see Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR System Nos. 200302747L and 200302744L, at
http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/., holding respectively that kettle corn and cinnamon
roasted nuts are taxable. Kettle corn, although a food product, is taxed if it is sold heated,
regardless of quantity, or if non-heated, in individual size servings, if the seller provides
tables and chairs; cinnamon roasted nuts are taxable as candy-coated confections.
71. Tex. H.B. 2424, § 16, 78th Leg., R.S., Tex. Gen. Laws 209 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.0035). This change codified a change in Comptroller policy adopted last
year. See also Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2027, 2035 (2003).
72. Id. § 17 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005(3)).
73. Sharp v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 953 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ de-
nied); see also Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 51 SMU L. REV. 1345, 1346 (1998).
74. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.011 (Vernon 2004).
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of the first day of the calendar quarter.75 The same section provides that
rate changes that occur after the beginning of the performance of a taxa-
ble service, but before its completion, will apply to the first billing period
for service performed after the effective date.76 The effort to comply
with the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement also resulted in two
new subsections being added to the Tax Code in order to help ensure
collection of local use taxes from purchasers. Permitted retailers are re-
quired to collect local use tax, even if they are not engaged in business in
the local jurisdiction where the taxable item is delivered. 77 In addition, a
person who desires to be a seller in Texas must agree to collect local use
tax even if the seller is not engaged in business in the local jurisdiction
where the taxable item is delivered. 78 These additions coincide with
other modifications made pursuant to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement which alter the sourcing rules for local sales taxes. The sourc-
ing rules for municipalities and counties that previously applied to "taxa-
ble items" were altered to apply solely to "tangible personal property. '79
These same sections also set forth a general rule that "the sale of a taxa-
ble service," other than certain services used both within and outside of
Texas, "is consummated at the location at which the service is performed
or otherwise delivered."'80 These sourcing rules triggered taxpayer con-
cern during the closing days of the regular session that the originally
drafted language could be construed to source multistate services (like
data processing) to the location from which such services are provided.
Taxpayers and comptroller staff worked together to craft the final lan-
guage, pursuant to which Texas's sourcing rules for multistate services
and for tangible personal property remain in effect. Because Texas law
continues to source sales of tangible personal property to the origin of the
sale rather than to destination for local sales tax purposes, Texas is not in
complete conformity with the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement, which
requires destination-based sourcing for such local taxes.
Special exceptions to these sourcing rules apply to telecommunications
services and calling cards. The sale of telecommunications services sold
on a call-by-call basis "is consummated at the location where the call
originates and terminates or the location where the call either originates
or terminates and at which the service address is also located. 81 The sale
of telecommunications services on a basis other than a call-by-call basis,
other than post-paid calling services, is consummated at the location of
the customer's place of primary use. 82 These telecommunication provi-
sions triggered substantial debate, as well as revised rules, and a letter
75. Tex. H.B. 2425, § 98, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1310 (adding TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.012(a)).
76. Id. (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.012(b)).
77. Id. § 100 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.103(d)).
78. Id. § 102 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.202(c)).
79. Id. §§ 115, 118 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 321.203, 323.203).
80. Id. §§ 115, 118 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 321.203(1), 323.203(1)).
81. Id. §§ 115, 118 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 321.203(g-1), 323.203(g-1)).
82. Id. §§ 115, 118 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 321.203(g-2), 323.203(g-2)).
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from the comptroller's staff that attempts to explain and justify the
State's current interpretations.8 3 Finally, a "sale of post-paid calling ser-
vices is consummated at the location of the origination point of the tele-
communications signal as first identified by the seller's
telecommunications system or by information received by the seller from
the seller's service provider if the system used to transport the signal is
not that of the seller."'8 4
Another provision adopted to comply with the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement could simplify and expedite the process of submit-
ting resale certificates. The 2003 Legislature inserted a new phrase that
allows resale certificates to be signed by electronic signatures authorized
by the comptroller.8 5 Numerous other provisions were adopted in the
attempt to comply with the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,
including the addition of definitions necessary for application of certain
streamlined sales tax provisions8 6 and administrative provisions that ap-
ply certain streamlined sales tax provisions to municipal and county sales
taxes.
8 7
Not all of the 2003 legislative changes to municipal sales arose from the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement; other alterations to the Tax
Code sought to clarify the rules regarding a retailer's "place of business"
for purposes of municipal sales and use tax collection. Effective on Sep-
tember 1, 2003, "[a]n outlet, office, facility, or location that contracts with
a retail or commercial business engaged in activities to which this chapter
applies to process for that business invoices or bills of lading onto which
sales tax is added is not a 'place of business of the retailer"' if the comp-
troller finds that the "location functions or exists to avoid" or to rebate to
the contracting business a portion of the municipal sales and use tax.88
Moreover, if the comptroller makes a finding described in the preceding
sentence, the sale is treated as if it were consummated at the place of
business of the retailer from whom the location purchased the taxable
item.89
The 78th Legislature also added a provision concerning records that
must be kept by providers of certain telecommunications services. Any
nontaxable charges that are combined with taxable telecommunication
83. Letter on file with author.
84. Tex. H.B. 2425, §§ 115, 118, 78th Leg., R.S., Tex. Gen. Laws 1310 (adding TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. §§ 321.203(g-3), 323.203(g-3)).
85. Id. § 101 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.152(b)(1)).
86. Id. § 93 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 142.002).
87. Id. §§ 114, 117 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 321.003, 323.003). Although it
is outside the scope of this Survey to review all the changes to the Texas Tax Code that
attempt to incorporate the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, there are several,
including some additional administrative sections of the Tax Code relating to the adoption
of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement such as amendments to Texas Tax Code
sections 142.005(c), 142.0055, and 142.011. See id. §§ 94-96.
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 321.002(a)(3) (Vernon 2004).
89. Id. § 321.203(l). The comptroller viewed this legislation as a means of deterring
taxpayers from setting up artificial billing offices solely for certain types of tax planning
purposes.
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service charges and not separately stated (as in "bundled" services) are
taxable "unless the provider can identify the portion of the [combined]
charges that are nontaxable through ... books and records kept in the
regular course of [the provider's] business." 90 The burden of proving
nontaxable charges from combined charges rests with the provider.91
The provision that imposes a surcharge as part of the plan to reduce
emissions from certain diesel equipment was substantially changed to al-
low for assessment of the surcharge not only in sales or leases of equip-
ment, but also for "storage, use, or other consumption in [the] state of
new or used equipment. ' 92 In addition, the rate of the surcharge was
raised from one percent to two percent of the sale or lease price,93 and
the definition of "equipment" subject to the surcharge was expanded by
deleting the limitation that the surcharge applies only to diesel equipment
"classified as construction equipment. ' '94
The 2003 Legislature added exemptions for various health care and
pharmaceutical facilities; pharmaceutical biotechnological cleanrooms re-
ceived a good deal of legislative attention. A sales tax exemption was
provided for "pharmaceutical biotechnology cleanrooms and equipment
that are installed as part of the construction of a new facility with a value
of at least $150 million and on which construction is began after July 1,
2003, and before August 31, 2004." 95 Another section added in 2003 de-
fines "pharmaceutical biotechnology cleanrooms and equipment" to in-
clude "all tangible personal property ...used in connection with the
manufacturing, processing, or fabrication in a cleanroom environment of
a pharmaceutical biotechnology product," "without regard to whether
such tangible personal property is affixed to or incorporated into realty
[and] without regard to whether such tangible personal property is actu-
ally contained in the cleanroom environment. '96 Moreover, a new provi-
sion states that "use of 'pharmaceutical biotechnology cleanrooms and
equipment.... to [produce] a pharmaceutical biotechnology product that
is not sold is not a divergent use if the use occurs during the certification
process by the United States Food and Drug Administration. '97 Cle-
anrooms were not the only subject of legislation in the pharmaceutical
field. The drug and medicine exemption was expanded to include "intra-
venous systems, supplies, and replacement parts used in the treatment of
humans." 98
90. Tex. H.B. 2425, § 99, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1310 (adding TEx. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.025(d)).
91. Id.
92. Tex. H.B. 1365, § 21, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1331 (adding TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.0515(b-1)).
93. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0515(b)).
94. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0515(a)).
95. Tex. H.B. 2425, § 106, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1310 (adding TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.318(b)(3)).
96. Id. (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(q-1)).
97. Id. § 107 (adding TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3181).
98. Tex. H.B. 2424, § 19, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 209 (adding TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.313(a)(15)).
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The legislature also spent a significant portion of 2003 largely rewriting
provisions that address the multitude of issues surrounding taxation of
customs brokers. It is beyond the scope of this Survey to detail the en-
tirety of the customs brokers provisions, as they are lengthy and techni-
cal, but limited in scope.99
Food and food-related services were also topics of legislative changes in
2003. The exemption for food products for human consumption was
modified by several changes to the definition of "food products," which
were generally intended to correspond with definitions contained in the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. Drugs and dietary supple-
ments were added to the list of items that are not food products, and
certain other items that were previously not food products (i.e., ice and
candy) were moved and relisted in new provisions within the statute.100
Carbonated and noncarbonated packaged soft drinks are now further de-
fined as "nonalcoholic beverages that contain natural or artificial sweet-
eners."10' In further attempts to reflect the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Agreement, a number of sections were added to the same statute to
define the term "diluted juice drink; '10 2 list prepared foods that are not
included in the food product exemption; 0 3 enumerate additional bakery
and grocery items that are included in the food product exemption;10 4
eliminate from the food product exemption the sale of any food products
from certain vending machines; 105 and eliminate from the food product
exemption any "food products, meals, soft drinks, and candy sold to a
person confined in a correctional facility operated under the authority...
of the state."'01 6 Another legislative modification to the Texas Tax Code
regarding food services provides that sales made by volunteers who are
volunteering for exempt organizations devoted to the exclusive purpose
of either religious training, physical training, or education with an ele-
mentary or secondary school are exempt from sales tax.' 07 The legislative
changes that passed in 2003 were not limited to taxation of the food or
food services themselves but also extended to certain inputs used in the
preparation of food. The exemption for electricity and gas used in prepa-
ration or storage of "food for immediate consumption" was altered to
99. However, we're happy to give you a starting point: See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§§ 151.157 (Vernon 2004) on the taxation of custom brokers generally; id. § 151.1575 on
requirements for issuing documentation showing the exportation of property; id. § 151.158
on import stamps; id. § 151.307 on exemptions required by prevailing law (incorporating
new proof required pursuant to other sections mentioned herein); id. § 151.406 on contents
and forms of certain reports (incorporating the proof required in § 151.307, as
amended); and id. § 151.712 on civil penalties for persons certifying exports.
100. Tex. H.B. 2425, § 103, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1310 (amending TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(c)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(c-1)).
103. Id. (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(c-2)).
104. Id. (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(c-3)).
105. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(f)).
106. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(g)).
107. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(e)(1)).
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exempt electricity and gas used in preparation or storage of "prepared
food" as described in Section 151.324(c-2) of the Tax Code. 108
The legislature also turned its attention to tax treatment of certain
newspaper materials during the Survey period. The exemption for cer-
tain newspapers and property used in newspapers was expanded to in-
clude newspapers that have an average sales price of $1.50, instead of the
previous limit of $0.75.109 The same exemption was clarified to include
tangible personal property that becomes an ingredient or component of
exempt special order newspaper inserts such as handbills, circulars, flyers,
or advertising supplements. 10
A number of other miscellaneous exemptions were clarified or added
by bills passed in the 78th Legislature. For instance, one addition pro-
vides that contractors are not eligible for the exemption for items used in
performance of a contract to improve real property."' The legislature
also added a provision that mobile telecommunications services are not
included in the exemption for long-distance calls that do not originate
from and bill to a number in Texas.112 The exemption available for cer-
tain water conservation services and equipment was limited to items used
"solely" for water conservation purposes. 113 A new section was added to
the Tax Code, which provides that separately itemized charges for labor
that is used to repair or remodel buildings listed on the National Register
of Historic Places are exempt from sale tax.114 Certain bingo equipment
is exempted from sales and use tax if it is "(1) purchased by an organiza-
tion licensed [by the State of Texas] to conduct bingo [and such organiza-
tion] is exempt from the payment of federal income taxes.., and (2) used
exclusively to conduct bingo authorized under Chapter 2001, Occupations
Code." 1 5 One final miscellaneous change during the Survey period was
not an exemption at all, but a revocation of power granted to local taxing
authorities. Legislation passed in 2003 stripped the governing bodies of
local taxing authorities of their power to repeal the application of the
popular "sales tax holiday. ' 116
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Although the comptroller amended several sales tax rules during the
Survey period, these rule revisions generally reflect recent legislative
changes rather than significant policy changes by the comptroller's office.
108. Id. § 104 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(a)).
109. Tex. H.B. 2424, § 21, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 204 (amending TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.319(f)).
110. Id. § 94 (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.319(c)).
111. Id. § 18 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.056(f)).
112. Id. § 22 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.323(b)).
113. Id. § 24 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.355).
114. Id. § 23 (adding TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3501).
115. Tex. H.B. 2519, § 32, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1144 (adding TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.3105).
116. Tex. H.B. 2425, § 121, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1310 (repealing TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 151.326(c)).
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For instance, Rule 3.320 implements changes made by the 78th Legisla-
ture to Section 151.0515 of the Tax Code concerning the Texas emissions
reduction plan surcharge on off-road, heavy-duty diesel equipment. 117
New Rule 3.367 incorporates the changes made in the 77th Legislature to
Sections 151.3162 and 151.317 of the Tax Code, which allowed a partial
refund or credit of tax paid on certain timber items that are purchased
during the period October 1, 2001, through December 31, 2007.118
The comptroller is also working on several draft rules, including a revi-
sion of the rule that addresses improvements to realty, 119 as well as a
revision of the rule that addresses intercorporate services.120
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. APPLICATION OF TAX
The Austin Court of Appeals issued two statutory interpretation cases
that merit discussion. Sergeant Enterprises, Inc. v. Strayhorn121 supported
the comptroller's position that a corporation may not take advantage of a
loss of a predecessor corporation that merged into the taxpayer for pur-
poses of computing its franchise tax liability. While the comptroller
agrees that the survivor of a merger may use its own pre-merger losses in
determining its franchise tax, the comptroller's interpretation of the Tax
Code has been that a pre-merger loss of the target corporation may not
be taken into account in computing the survivor's franchise tax analysis.
The appellant in this case, the survivor of a two-tiered merger, attempted
to use the cumulative business loss of one of the target corporations in
computing its franchise tax liability. The court viewed the provision at
issue, Tax Code Section 171.110(e),1 22 which authorizes a "deduction" of
a business loss, as tantamount to an exemption that must be construed
strictly in favor of the comptroller. The taxpayer's arguments, including
its argument that the business loss transfers to the successor corporation
pursuant to Tax Code Section 171.110(e) as read in tandem with Section
5.06A(2) of the Business Corporation Act, failed to convince the court;
the court refused to interpret the statute to allow the survival of the busi-
ness loss. 123
Westcott Communications, Inc. v. Strayhorn1 24 focused on whether the
taxpayer's receipts from its sales of programming to subscribers through-
out the country via satellite broadcast and videotape should be consid-
ered Texas receipts (on the ground that the broadcasts were prepared and
117. See 34 TEx. ADM1N. CODE § 3.320 (2004).
118. See id. § 3.367.
119. Id. § 3.347.
120. Id. § 3.331.
121. Sergeant Enters., Inc. v. Strayhorn, 112 S.W. 3d 241 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no
pet.).
122. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(e) (Vernon 2004).
123. Sergent Enters., Inc., 12 S.W.3d at 247-51.
124. Westcott Communications, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 104 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003, pet. denied).
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transmitted from Texas) or apportioned among numerous states (on the
ground that the customers received the transmissions at their locations,
not where the broadcasts were prepared). 125 Taxpayer's "informational[ ]
and training program" was delivered to subscribers throughout the nation
via satellite broadcast and videotape. 126 While the comptroller conceded
that the videotape subscription reviews should be apportioned based on
the location of the subscriber, the comptroller argued-and prevailed-
on her theory that "service performed in this state" (the statutory buzz
words) should be interpreted to mean the place "where the 'act is
done." 2 7 The taxpayer pointed out that subscription television services
like cable television are sourced according to the subscriber's locations.
However, the court concluded that whereas broadcasters are paid to
broadcast television programming, Westcott was being paid to provide
training and that its customers had the option of receiving the training via
videotapes or via broadcast. 128 This case also presents an interesting dis-
cussion of the taxpayer's several Constitutional arguments, but finds none
of them compelling.129 Interestingly, this case, like Sergeant, gave signifi-
cant deference to the comptroller's administrative positions; indeed, in
Sergeant, the court cited letter rulings from the comptroller's website as
evidence of the comptroller's consistent interpretation.1 30
It is tempting, and not altogether inaccurate, to describe comptroller
franchise tax hearings from the survey in two words: taxpayer loses. In
many circumstances, taxpayer losses may be attributed to the taxpayer's
pursuing issues that have been resolved in prior hearings. The issue in
Hearing 42,310 involves statutes of limitation for filing a claim for re-
fund.' 3 ' The dispute centered on whether the 1997 addition to the Tax
Code of Section 111.206(f)(2), which added audits by the Internal Reve-
nue Service as a factor that could toll the statute of limitations,132 should
be applied prospectively or retrospectively. Unlike many cases, this is a
situation in which the taxpayer, rather than the comptroller, argued for
retrospective application of the new language, as a retrospective applica-
tion of the language would have allowed the taxpayer's claim for refund.
Noting that this issue had been addressed in prior claims, the comptroller
ruled against the taxpayer. 133 The case remains interesting for its discus-
125. While it is clear that, in many situations, sales of services are sourced for sales tax
purposes where the benefit of the sale is received (see, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330
(2004) pertaining to data processing), in the franchise tax context services are treated as
creating Texas receipts if the services are performed in Texas.
126. Westcott Communications, Inc., 104 S.W.3d at 144.
127. Id. at 145-56.
128. Id. at 147.
129. Id. at 147-50.
130. Sergeant Enters., Inc. v. Strayhorn, 112 S.W.3d 241, 250 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003,
no pet.).
131. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, STAR System No. 200308116H (Aug. 13,
2003), at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/star/.
132. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.206(f)(2) (Vernon 2004).




sion of statutory interpretation, particularly in the context of prospective
versus retrospective application.
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
As in the past few sessions, several franchise tax bills were introduced
in 2003 that had the potential to make significant changes in the way the
Texas franchise tax operates. Some bills would have extended the
franchise tax to all business entities, including partnerships and certain
trusts; other bills sought to limit the amount of deductions that a
franchise tax payor may claim with respect to expenses paid to affiliates.
In the end, the Texas Legislature found itself caught between the desire
to alter the franchise tax in a way that some described as "closing loop-
holes" and the reality that such "loophole closing" would in fact consti-
tute a new tax. The tension between "closing the loopholes" and not
enacting new taxes was exacerbated by the fact that many of the propos-
als to expand the tax to partnerships would, in some circumstances, have
resulted in taxing income of individuals, thereby violating the Texas Con-
stitutional amendment that precludes an income tax on individual income
without voter approval. At the end of the year's multiple sessions, the
franchise tax changes actually adopted were far from the sweeping
changes the legislature had considered and less significant in many ways
than the procedural changes enacted with respect to refund claims and
other administrative matters. Some of the changes were intended as con-
forming changes required by judicial or other interpretations. For exam-
ple, the Section 171.001 changes deleted the portion of the section that
purported to impose franchise tax on any corporation authorized to do
business under Texas law, 134 to make the Tax Code consistent with the
holding of Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp.135 Other changes de-
scribed by the legislature as mere clarifications addressed franchise tax
exemptions for certain insurance companies 136 and the exemption for
certain tenants of trade shows. 137 Also, a reference to "amount[s] exclud-
able under Section 171.110(k)," was added to Sections 171.1032 and
171.1051, which define the amounts deductible by a corporation in deter-
mining its gross receipts. 138 The legislators also revised the definition of
"surplus" in Section 171.109 by adding a new subsection (a-i) to provide
that "a legally enforceable obligation that requires the return of a like-
134. Tex. H.B. 2424, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 209 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)).
135. Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 298-301 (Tex. App.-Austin
2000, pet. denied).
136. Tex. H.B. 2424, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 209 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.052).
137. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.084(c)).
138. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.1032, .1051). Corresponding changes
were made to Section 171.110. Specifically, Section 171.110(k) now explicitly provides that
"dividends and interest received from federal obligations are not included in earned sur-
plus or gross receipts," and Section 171.100(1) defines federal obligations. Id. (amending
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110).
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kind property that was borrowed Will be considered debt if it is a liability
according to generally accepted accounting principles and if the return
must be made within an ascertainable period of time or on demand. 11 39
This section further provides that "[t]he amount . . . considered debt is
the fair market value measured on the last day on which the [franchise
tax] report" is due. 140  By way of administrative change, Section
171.203(f) now allows a public information report to be filed
electronically. 14
1
Additional changes were also made to franchise tax provisions affect-
ing certain refunds for job creation enterprise zones, tax credits for cer-
tain job creation activities, and other changes relating to tax credits for
the job creation activities. 142 The legislature also added an additional
Subchapter U to the franchise tax code to provide a tax credit for title
insurance holding companies, available to a title insurance holding com-
pany that is subject to Chapter 823 of the Insurance Code and that con-
trols one or more domestic title insurance companies subject to certain
insurance premiums imposed under the Insurance Code.143
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
In Harris County Appraisal District v. Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp., the Houston Court of Appeals held that Section 25.25(c)(3) of the
Tax Code does not provide the proper method for a taxpayer to assert a
right to interstate allocation of aircraft.1 44 The taxpayer in this case
owned two business aircraft that had significant non-Texas use and thus
would be entitled under Section 21.03 to allocate to Texas only the por-
tion of the fair market value of the aircraft that reflected their use in
Texas. 145 However, for the years at issue (1995 through 1998), the tax-
payer did not request any such allocation and did not protest the ap-
praisal district's determination of the aircrafts' taxable value, which was
based on allocating one hundred percent of value to Texas. 146 Finally re-
alizing that it had missed out on an opportunity to reduce substantially its
property taxes, the taxpayer in 2000 sought to reduce the taxable value of
139. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109).
140. Id. (amending TEX. TAx CODE ANN. § 171.109).
141. Id. (amending TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.203).
142. Tex. S.B. 275, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 814 (amending TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. §§ 171.501, .751).
143. Tex. H.B. 2424, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 209 (adding Subchapter U to
Chapter 171 of the Texas Tax Code and adding § 171.892 to Subchapter U). Confusingly
enough, the Texas Legislature enacted two subchapter rules that deal with tax credits for
certain insurance companies.
144. Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 99 S.W.3d 849, 852
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). See also A & S Air Serv., Inc. v.
Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist., 99 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.);
Kellair Aviation Co. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 99 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 2003, pet. denied).




these aircraft for the years 1995 through 1998 by moving to correct the
tax rolls pursuant to Section 25.25(c)(3), which provides: "The appraisal
review board, on motion of the chief appraiser or of a property owner,
may ... change[] ... the [tax roll] for any of the five preceding years to
correct ... the inclusion of property that does not exist in the form or at
the location described in the [tax] roll. '147
Consistent with most (but not all) of the other Texas courts of appeals
that have considered this issue, the Houston court held that a taxpayer
may not rely on Section 25.25(c)(3) to obtain an interstate allocation, rea-
soning that Section 25.25(c)(3) is applicable only when no property exists
at the location where property is being taxed, but not when property is at
a location for a shorter time than described on the tax roll.148 The only
contrary case is Himont U.S.A., Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District,
in which another Houston Court of Appeals, for the First District, rea-
soned that "location" includes the tax situs of property, not just its physi-
cal location, given that an improper interstate allocation can result in a
violation of the constitutional nexus test for taxation of property used in
interstate commerce.149 However, in Harris County Appraisal District v.
Texas Gas Transmission Corp., that same court changed its opinion on the
issue and sided with the majority of Texas courts of appeals. 150
In the fourth (but probably not the last) sequel to the real life drama
concerning the constitutionality of the Texas school financing system, the
Texas Supreme Court in West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent
School District v. Alanis reversed the Texas court of appeals by holding
that a lawsuit claiming that the state's school financing system includes an
unconstitutional state property tax should not be dismissed.151 Relying
on language in Edgewood IV, which held that the state's school financing
system is constitutional but cautioned that the system would violate the
prohibition against a state property tax if the $1.50 cap on maintenance
and operations (M&O) tax rate effectively becomes a floor on the tax
rate rather than a ceiling, 152 several school districts alleged that "that day
has come" and thus the school financing system now violates the state
property tax prohibition. 153 The district court dismissed the case on the
147. Id. at 850-51 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(3) (Vernon 2001)).
148. Id. at 851-52.
149. Id. at 851 (citing Himont U.S.A., Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 904 S.W.2d
740, 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)).
150. Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. Gas Transmission Corp., 105 S.W.3d 88, 98-
99 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (en banc); see also SLW Aviation,
Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 105 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.). The court also held that a taxpayer asserting that its aircraft's taxable value
should be reduced due to interstate use must provide sufficient information on its rendition
statement to permit the appraisal district to apply the allocation formula to the aircraft.
Tex. Gas Transmission Corp., 105 S.W.3d at 94; see also SLW Aviation, Inc., 105 S.W.3d at
102.
151. W. Orange-Cove Consol Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 585 (Tex.
2003).
152. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 738 (Tex. 1995).
153. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 107 S.W.3d at 562.
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pleadings, reasoning that the state property tax prohibition could not be
supported given that fewer than half of Texas's school districts taxed at
the maximum rates; the court of appeals affirmed, relying not on the per-
centage of school districts taxing at maximum rates but on its belief that
school districts were not forced to tax at the maximum rate to provide an
accredited education.1 54
The plaintiff tax districts asserted that, in order to educate their stu-
dents, they had lost all meaningful discretion in setting their M&O rate,
and thus the cap on the M&O rate effectively became a statewide prop-
erty tax. Indeed, these districts' only option that would allow them to
continue to function is to cut programs and employee positions, given
that cap on the M&O tax rate. The plaintiffs thus sought a declaratory
judgment that the $1.50 M&O cap rate is unconstitutional. 155
In considering the plaintiffs' position and the grounds for dismissal by
the trial court and the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded (1) that a single school district can state a claim for a violation of
the statewide property tax if that school district is constrained by the state
to tax at a particular rate (although left undecided is how a constitutional
violation in one or a few school districts impacts the Texas school financ-
ing system in general); 156 (2) that by requiring schools to provide ade-
quate education, the legislature effectively offers a school district no
meaningful discretion to tax at lower than the cap rate if the imposition of
a lower rate would prevent the school district from providing adequate
education; 157 (3) that school districts that have opted for an increased
homestead exemption are not necessarily precluded from alleging that
they have no meaningful discretion but to tax at the cap rate; rather,
school districts can assert, and attempt to establish, that even if they did
not grant the maximum homestead exemption they would still be unable
to provide an accredited education;158 and (4) that school districts that do
not tax at the cap rate can also assert a constitutional violation of prohibi-
tion against a statewide property tax-the court's rationale being that a
district taxing slightly less than the cap rate that can no longer provide an
accredited education at the cap rate need not raise its rate to the cap rate
merely to establish its cause of action. 159
In a case of first impression, the San Antonio court of appeals held in
Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc.,
that a possibility of reverter interest in real estate is not extinguished in a
tax foreclosure sale. 160 In this case, several tax units sued the property
owner, Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., for delinquent taxes, seeking a personal
154. Id.
155. Id. at 573.
156. Id. at 579.
157. Id. at 579-80.
158. Id. at 582-83.
159. Id. at 583.
160. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 67, 73
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied).
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judgment against the property owner and foreclosure of the property.
The tax units also brought suit against an entity whose sole interest in the
property was a possibility of reverter; specifically, the entity would ac-
quire fee ownership of the property if the property is ever used for a
purpose other than flood control. The owner of the possibility of reverter
moved for summary judgment, alleging that the purchaser at the foreclo-
sure sale would take title to the property subject to the possibility-of-
reverter interest. 161
Based on several arguments, the tax units asserted that their tax liens
are superior to the possibility of reverter interest. First, the tax units cited
to Sections 32.05 and 33.54 of the Tax Code, which essentially provide
that a tax lien takes priority over other claims against the property. 162
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the "possibility of a re-
verter is not a claim [but is instead] an interest in the property distinct
from [the delinquent taxpayer's] interest.' 63 The tax units then argued
that Section 34.01(n) provides that the tax foreclosure sale vests to the
purchaser the "interest owned by the defendant," which the tax units as-
sert includes the possibility of reverter.1 64 The court rejected this argu-
ment because the owner of the possibility of reverter interest was not a
proper defendant in the lawsuit and thus cannot be delinquent on the tax
obligation. 65 Finally, the tax units argued that Texas common law pro-
vides "that tax liens ... are afforded precedence over private rights and
interests," citing State v. Bank of Mineral Wells, in which "[t]he court held
that a tax lien was superior to [a] bank[ ]lien despite any express state-
ment [to that effect] by the Texas Legislature.' 66 The court distinguished
Bank of Mineral Wells because that case "was limited to a lien, not a
possibility of reverter."'1 67
In Houston Land & Cattle Co., L. C. v. Harris County Appraisal Dis-
trict, a Houston court of appeals addressed a property owner's challenge
to delinquent property taxes for twenty years, based on the assertion that
the prior property owner had not been notified of property valuation in-
creases, as required by Section 25.19 of the Tax Code. 168 The property
owner's position was that the property taxes were void as to the prior
owner because of lack of notice and thus unenforceable against the cur-
rent property owner and its successors. The court rejected the property
owner's position on two grounds. First, Section 41.11(c) provides that
"[f]ailure of the appraisal district to deliver notice [of an increase in
value] to 'the property owner"' nullifies the increase in property valua-
161. Id. at 69.
162. Id. at 71 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 32.05, 33.54 (Vernon 2001)).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01(n) (Vernon 2001)).
165. Id. at 72.
166. Id. (citing State v. Bank of Mineral Wells, 251 S.W.1107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1923, writ ref'd)).
167. Id.
168. Houston Land & Cattle Co., L.C. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 104 S.W.3d
622, 623-24 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
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tion, "but only 'to the extent the change is applicable to that property
owner;'"169 thus, the court reasoned, the successor owner cannot rely on
lack of notice to the prior owner to challenge the delinquent taxes. Sec-
ond, "a protesting 'property owner' [must] comply with the payment re-
quirements of Section 42.08" in order to have a valid suit; in this case, the
taxes were not timely paid.170
In a rare victory for property taxpayers in 2003, a Houston court of
appeals in Spring Branch Independent School District v. Siebert addressed
whether tax bills provided a sufficiently specific description of the prop-
erty at issue "to sustain a judgment for judicial foreclosure of tax liens
and to impose personal liability against the [property owners]."' 171 In Sie-
bert, Spring Branch I.S.D. sued the Sieberts to collect property taxes for
years 1996 and 1997 on an approximately two-acre tract. "In 1995, the
Sieberts recorded a plot subdividing the tract into three lots, described as
'Saddlewood Estates Lot 9 and Creekview Lots 1 and 2'.. . . However,
[the appraisal district] described the three replatted lots as 'Lots 1, 2 and
9, Block 1, Saddlewood Estates R/P/."1 72 In 1998, a district court "en-
tered an agreed final judgment against the Sieberts, declaring the 1995
replat to be in violation of deed restrictions" and invalid, although the
decision was not retroactive.1 73 Spring Branch I.S.D.'s suit to collect
property taxes described the properties as "Lot 9, Saddlewood Estates
and Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Saddlewood Estates. ' 174 The Sieberts paid the
taxes for Lot 9 but did not pay the taxes for Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Sad-
dlewood Estates. 175
The district court held that Spring Branch I.S.D. "could not collect
taxes for 1996 and 1997 on Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Saddlewood Estates
because the property had not been properly described."1 76 Spring
Branch I.S.D. contended that the "1996 and 1997 tax bills provided 'spe-
cific account numbers and ... legal descriptions' sufficient to sustain a
judgment for.., foreclosure of tax liens."'1 7 7 However, the court rejected
this argument because both the appraisal rolls and the tax bills listed four
account numbers, somehow listing Lot 9 twice, but with none of the ac-
count numbers describing Lots 1 and 2 as part of Creekview.' 78 The court
reasoned that although Spring Branch I.S.D. asserts that "this is merely a
cosmetic error," the appraisal district's maps also did not clearly match
the appraisal district records to the properties at issue1 79
169. Id. at 624 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.11(c) (Vernon 2001)) (emphasis
excluded).
170. Id. at 625 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.411(c) (Vernon 2001)).
171. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Siebert, 100 S.W.3d 520, 523 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).




176. Id. at 523.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 524.




Although prior law required taxpayers to render tangible personal
property, there was no penalty for failing to do so (imagine the effective-
ness of a speed limit without the risk of a speeding ticket). However,
effective for the 2004 tax year, there is a ten percent penalty of taxes due
for failure to file a rendition statement or for filing a late rendition state-
ment. 180 Also, there is a penalty of up to fifty percent of taxes due for a
fraudulent rendition statement. 181 Pursuant to a temporary amnesty pro-
vision, taxpayers had the opportunity of avoiding the risk of untaxed as-
sets being discovered and taxed as omitted property for tax years 2001
and 2002 by filing a special amnesty rendition statement from September
1, 2003, through November 30, 2003.182
In legislation that is a relief to taxpayers, if (1) property is being ap-
praised by two or more appraisal districts and (2) the appraisal districts
are not in agreement by May 1 of a tax year on the property's value, then
all such appraisal districts must treat its value as being the lowest value of
any of such appraisal districts. 183 In addition, if the value of property
appraised by more than one appraisal district is lowered as a result of a
contest (administrative or judicial), and that value becomes the lowest
value of all such appraisal districts, then that value must be used by all
such appraisal districts. 184 In 1999, the Texas Legislature passed legisla-
tion that "encouraged" appraisal districts to appraise properties at the
same value but imposed no penalties for failing to do so. As with the
prior law's requirement to render that was not backed up by penalties,
mere encouragement did not lead to results.
Several bills were passed concerning valuation. For example, the rules
for taxpayers challenging valuation based on unequal appraisal were
modified to specify what appraisal districts must demonstrate in order to
prevail in such a dispute.185 In addition, the statute governing how the
appraisal district must determine value under the income method of valu-
ation was amended to provide that the appraisal district must exclude
from the value of real property (1) tangible personal property, (2) intan-
gible personal property, and (3) other property not subject to appraisal as
real property. 186 Also, an owner of inventory may waive the right to have
its inventory valued under the special inventory valuation provisions. 8 7
The homestead exemption was amended to provide that the exemption
is not lost if the homeowner does not occupy the residence and (1) he or
180. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 22.28(a) (Vernon 2004).
181. Id. § 22.29(a).
182. Id. § 22.23(c).
183. Id. § 6.025(d).
184. Id.
185. Tex. H.B. 1082, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1041 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 41.43(a), (b)).
186. Tex. H.B. 1460, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 548 (adding TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 23.014).
187. Tex. H.B. 2726, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 700 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 23.20(a)).
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she intends to reoccupy the residence and the absence is for less than two
years; (2) the absence is due to military service; or (3) the owner was in a
facility which provides services related to health, infirmity, or aging.188
The deadline for filing the homestead exemption was changed from one
year after the taxes were paid to one year after the delinquency date for
the taxes on the homestead. 189
Texas voters approved an amendment to the Texas Constitution pro-
viding an exemption for land owned by a religious organization that is
leased for school uses or that will be used to expand or construct a place
of religious worship and which produces no revenue for the religious or-
ganization. 190 Texas voters also approved the expansion to two years,
from six months, of the period during which the former owner of a min-
eral interest that was sold in a tax foreclosure sale may repurchase the
property. 191 Texas voters also approved the expansion of the tax freeze
provision that applies to elderly to also apply to disabled persons and
extended the elderly tax freeze for school taxes to also apply to county,
municipality, and junior college district taxes if approved by the relevant
tax unit.192
The open-space rollback tax provision was amended to expand the cir-
cumstances under which rollback taxes do not apply. 193 They include
a transfer of the property from the state, a political subdivision of the
state, or a nonprofit corporation created by a municipality with a
population of more than one million under the Development Corpo-
ration Act . . . to an individual or a business entity for purposes of
economic development if the [Texas C]omptroller determines that
the economic development is likely to generate for deposit in the
general revenue fund during the next two fiscal bienniums an
amount of taxes and other revenues that equals or exceeds [twenty]
times the amount of additional taxes and interest that would have
been imposed under the [rollback tax provision] . . . had the sanc-
tions provided by that subsection applied to the transfer. 194
IV. PROCEDURE
Political infighting, atypical of most Texas legislative sessions, marked
this year's legislative sessions and resulted in enactment of several limits
and restrictions on the refund process. Unfortunately, most of these re-
strictions are unlikely to yield positive results, while they complicate and
slow down the administrative refund process.
188. Tex. H.B. 1223, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 240 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 11.13(L)).
189. Tex. H.B. 2147, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 650 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 11.431(a)).
190. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
191. Id. § 13(c).
192. Id. § 1-b(h).
193. Tex. S.B. 480, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1176 (amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 23.55).
194. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.55(f)(4) (Vernon 2004).
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SMU LAW REVIEW
Among the most unusual maneuverings of the legislature (and there
were many this year) was the hasty passage of Rider 11 to the general
appropriations bill, House Bill 1. The rider was designed to limit refund
amounts paid during the biennium, effectively capping the amount of re-
funds that a taxpayer could receive without specific legislative appropria-
tions and therefore limits the comptroller's authority to pay refunds in
excess of $250,000 to a particular taxpayer during the biennium. 195 The
limit applies to refund claims, final judgments, and settlement agree-
ments. The legislation purports to limit the amount of refunds that can be
granted even pursuant to a final court judgment (although there is an
exception for court judgments entered prior to the effective date of the
law). 196 Rider 11 contemplates that any claim or portion of a claim that is
in excess of the $250,000 limit shall be presented in the next legislature
for a specific appropriation in order for the payment to be made. 197
Unlike many tax measures, this provision was not originated in and was
not generally supported by the comptroller's staff. The comptroller's
staff issued an initial policy statement on July 14, 2003, and a subsequent
rule amendment designed to make implementation of Rider ll's limita-
tion provisions somewhat more manageable. 198 One of the important ex-
ceptions articulated by the comptroller's staff is that the bill would not
apply to refunds of overpayment of taxes that are claimed within 120 days
after the due date of the tax;199 this exception is designed to cover unin-
tended overpayments on current taxes and situations in which the tax-
payer pays an amount intended to ensure that the taxpayer has not made
an underpayment (e.g., a franchise taxpayer who remits tax prior to hav-
ing finished its federal income tax and franchise tax filings). The comp-
troller's initial policy interpretation also made clear that each tax type
would stand alone and carry its own $250,000 aggregate cap; an amount
that exceeds $250,000 will not be refunded, but the taxpayer will be enti-
tled to receive $250,000.200 Amounts in excess of the cap may be used as
credits under certain circumstances. 20 1 The cap on refunds was immedi-
ately controversial and was almost repealed during the special sessions;
unfortunately, budget concerns made it difficult for the legislators to
agree to repeal Rider 11, and it remains in the law. 20 2
As if Rider l's restrictions on refunds were not onerous enough, the
legislature also enacted a provision directing a "state auditor" to review
195. Tex. H.B. 1, art. VI, rider 11, 78th Leg., R.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1330.
196. Id. Constitutional aficionados will enjoy the prospect of the judiciary's determin-
ing whether the legislature may constitutionally restrict courts' ability to authorize refunds
that are clearly due to the taxpayer under substantive tax law.
197. Id.
198. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.2(d) (2003).
199. Id. § 3.2(d)(2)(C)(ii).
200. See id. § 3.2(d)(1)(A).
201. Id. § 3.2(d)(3).
202. In fact, the House voted unanimously in August 2003 to repeal Rider 11, indicating
a possibility that the provisions may be repealed during a future session.
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tax settlements entered into by the comptroller.20 3 As originally intro-
duced, the provision not only granted the state auditor the right to review
settlements but would also have made public certain information, includ-
ing refund and settlement amounts, by reference to identified taxpayers.
The state auditor review has its roots more in the disagreement be-
tween the comptroller's office and the legislature that characterized the
2003 sessions than in solid tax policy. Although the state auditor may
review and criticize settlements (and settlements are described in an ex-
traordinarily broad manner2 04), the auditor does not have the right to
"undo" the comptroller's decisions.205 Nonetheless, the political tension
created by the review process serves as an additional barrier to settling
cases. Unfortunately, the additional barrier applies to virtually all cases,
increasing the difficulty of settling even cases based on assessments that
are clearly erroneous (for example, an assessment by an auditor who had
inadequate time before the statute of limitations ran to complete his re-
view and who made clearly erroneous assumptions as to the amount of
the tax due).
Although the state auditor review as enacted is less onerous than its
earlier versions, it remains an additional hurdle for taxpayers wishing to
settle or compromise their cases. While the legislation purports to limit
judicially-ordered refunds, the courts may well decide that the restrictions
are an unacceptable legislative encroachment on the judiciary.
As the Survey period concluded, legislators were continuing to con-
sider yet another Special Session to address (again) funding public educa-
tion and changing (raising?) taxes. But that's a story for next year's
Survey ....
203. Tex. H.B. 7, § 23.01, 78th Leg., 3d C.S., 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3 (adding TEX. Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 321.0138).
204. "Settlement" in this provision includes "a settlement of a claim for a tax, refund, or
credit of a tax, penalty, or interest"; a "settlement of a taxpayer suit"; or "any circumstance
in which a taxpayer received a warrant, offset, check, payment, or credit from the comp-
troller or comptroller's office arising from the filing of a tax return." Id.
205. See id.
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